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LIABILITY OF SUPPLIERS
OF NATURAL RAW MATERIALS
AND THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-A FIRST STEP
TOWARD SOUND PUBLIC POLICY
M. Stuart Madden*
From its inception, the law governing liability for damage or injuries caused by defective products has pertained to potential liability
for products that have been processed, finished, or fabricated.
Naturally occurring raw materials, for the most part, have been
considered beyond doctrinalconcern, largely because characterizing
a merchantableraw material,such as copper or pigiron,as defective
is conceptually difficult. Nevertheless, certain doctrines that developed for the application of products liability to otherproducts have
gained sporadic application to naturally occurring raw materials,
including the sophisticated purchaser defense, the bulk supplier
defense, and the ingredient supplier defense. Madden argues that
the proliferation of discrete defenses only has spawned confusion,
and has not altered the decisional history demonstrating that
liability will not be imposed for sale of bulk quantities of naturally
occurring raw materials. Consequently, he concludes that the new
Restatement should provide a comment stating explicitly that
liability should not attach to such sellers absent a showing of a
defect in the raw material itself that poses an unreasonablerisk of
personalphysical injury.

INTRODUCTION

Tentative Draft Number 2 of the Restatement (Third)of Torts:
Products Liability,' together with Tentative Draft Number 3,2
addiess a very important practical issue: the duty in tort law of

*
James D. Hopkins Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; B.A. 1971,
University of Pennsylvania; M.A. 1972, London School of Economics and Political
Science; J.D. 1976, Georgetown University Law Center. Gratitude is extended to
Kimberly Weston and Matthew Ross for their valuable research assistance and to the
American Tort Reform Association for its support of this research.
1.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRODUCTS LIABLITYr (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1995) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 2].

2.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LiABiLITY (Tentative Draft No. 3,

1996) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 3].
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suppliers of raw materials3 that occur in nature. The Reporters
of the proposed Restatement have done a commendable job, but
unresolved characterization and warning issues concerning
natural raw materials retain their ambiguity in the current
draft.4 In addition, crucial public policy issues surrounding the
liability issue demand more precision.
The commentary to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section
402A 5 intimates that merchantable, naturally occurring raw
materials such as copper, silver, and lead generally should not
be considered defective, and that sellers of such raw materials
ordinarily should be conferred de jure immunity.7 To reach this

3.
In its broad sense, the term "raw material" is used to describe material sold in
bulk that is transformed in the course of the production of the completed product.
Under this definition, both naturally occurring and synthetic or processed substances,
ranging from rolled copper to Teflon, may be categorized as "raw materials."
4.
The principal characterization issues are the determination of whether naturally occurring raw materials are "products" within the meaning of products liability or
whether a natural substance becomes a product only upon some measure of processing;
and whether the incorporation of a raw material into another product so changes its
original properties that the raw material seller is relieved of potential liability.
The pertinent warning or informational issues are whether there exists a duty to
warn of the natural propensities of substances that have been in use since time
immemorial; and, if such warnings are required, to whom are they owed. As to the
latter point, the issue often is one of evaluating whether a seller of a raw material may
fairly rely upon a sophisticated purchaser to convey any warning to those who will come
into contact with the material.
5.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A states, in
pertinent part: "(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property .... " Id.
6.
See id. cmt. p ("[Tlhe manufacturer of pigiron, which is capable of a wide
variety of uses, is not so likely to be held to strict liability when it turns out to be
unsuitable for the child's tricycle into which it is finally made by a remote buyer."); cf
Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 2, § 10 cmt. c. Comment c states, in pertinent part:
A basic raw material such as sand, gravel, or kerosine cannot be defectively
designed. If there is an inappropriate decision in the use of such materials, the
failing is not attributable to the supplier of the raw materials, but rather to the
fabricator that put them to use.... The same considerations apply to failure-towarn claims against sellers of raw materials.
Id.
7.
The author employs the phrase de jure immunity in its conventional sense,
which is to say that immunity is conferred as a matter of definition or as a matter of
law. See, e.g., Plummer v. Abbott Lab., 568 F. Supp. 920 (D.R.I. 1983). In Plummer, a
DES case, the trial court applied a de jure approach to granting defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress
based on heightened concern for the medical risks imposed upon their daughters. See
id. at 922-24. In the court's words:
As to each of the claims at bar, either a mother-and-daughter relationship exists,
or the plaintiff herself is held out to be the injured party. Yet, having in mind the
lack of physical symptomatology on the part of the mother in each instance, and
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result, some courts have said that material not reduced to
consumable form is not a product within the meaning of products liability law.8 Moreover, most naturally occurring raw
materials are integrated into altogether different products
before being sold to the consuming public. The implications of
this process of integration into a new form were summarized by
one respected author, who stated that once "the component part
is no longer distinguishable or capable of being identified on its
own, it loses its status as a product." 9
Such a finding-that the material is not a product within the
contemplation of products liability law, that a "no duty"' ° rather
than a "limited duty"" rule should apply-has a sound public

as to the daughters in many instances, such a facile conclusion may indeed beg
the question: there may well be, de jure, no injured party. If Rhode Island hews
to the corporal manifestation rule, these cases may well illustrate a modern
example of the damnum absque injuria maxim.
Id. at 923-24.
As used elsewhere in this Article, the phrase "de facto immunity" is immunity that
the courts have applied on a case-by-case basis, often through the application of defenses
known as the bulk supplier defense, the ingredient supplier defense, and the sophisticated purchaser defense. As summarized by the Reporters, "Some courts invoke special
doctrines such as the 'raw material supplier defense' or the 'bulk sales/sophisticated purchaser rule' to negate liability." Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 2, § 10 cmt. a, at 28.
8.
See, e.g., wyrulec Co. v. Schutt, 866 P.2d 756, 760 (Wyo. 1993) (holding strict
liability doctrine inapplicable in a suit brought against an electrical utility for injuries
sustained when an employee touched transmission wires because electricity is not "a
product"); cf. Kennedy v. Vacation Internationale, Ltd., 841 F. Supp. 986, 989 (D. Haw.
1994) (holding that tile used in resort's flooring was not a."product" under Hawaii law
because it became a building fixture when laid).
9.
Charles E. Cantu, The Illusive Meaning of the Term 'Product" UnderSection
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 635, 656 (1994).
10. A "no duty" rule is in essence a policy conclusion that the relationship between
either the plaintiff and the defendant, or the plaintiffs harm and the defendant's causal
contribution to that harm, does not warrant shifting the burden of plaintiffs loss to the
defendant. Sometimes this "no duty" conclusion is reached on the basis that plaintiffs
harm is so remote from defendant's conduct as to preclude liability. See, e.g., Palsgraf
v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100-01 (N.Y. 1928) (denying recovery where defendant's conduct was not a wrong in its relation to plaintiff and thus did not involve an
invasion of a legally protected interest). In other settings, a "no duty" rule is grounded
in the perception that the plaintiff and defendant's relationship is so remote that any
other course would be unwieldy, arbitrary, or both, from the perspective of judicial
administration. See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309
(1927) (stating that "a tort to the person or property of one man does not make the
tortfeasor liable to another merely because the injured person was under a contract
with that other, unknown to the doer of the wrong").
11.
A "limited duty" rule, such as the "informed intermediary," "sophisticated
purchaser," see infra note 13 and Part II.B, or "bulk supplier" rules, see infra notes 13,
37-40 and accompanying text, presumes that defendant has a duty toward plaintiff, but
that it is delegable to another upon the satisfaction of certain circumstances. In the
context of the "informed intermediary," "sophisticated purchaser," or "bulk supplier"
doctrines, the delegee of such duties is ordinarily the immediate vendee.

284

University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform

[VOL. 30:2&3

policy basis. Raw materials suppliers are generally distanced
from subsequent design decisions and subsequent warnings
decisions, as well as remote from knowledge of the end use of
the material in a finished product. 12 Courts also have appreciated that naturally occurring raw materials are ordinarily sold in
bulk,1 3 and further have understood that such raw materials
are conventionally "redesigned" in the course of creating the
final manufactured product, and thus lose their essential
characteristics. For example, redesigned aluminum, such as an
aluminum alloy, is no longer raw aluminum. 4 Additionally,

12.
Some courts have reached the same result by observing that the raw material
had not been reduced to consumable form. See Cantu, supra note 9, at 653 (listing
jurisdictions that have found electricity not to be a "product" within the meaning of
products liability, based in part upon the conclusion that it is a "commodity which can
not be packaged, labeled, and sold and, therefore, is not a fungible good"); cf Houston
Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 765 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. 1988) (holding that
although electricity is a "product," strict liability was precluded because at the time of
the accident, the electricity was not in the condition in which it could be sold).
.13.
As recited by the Reporters:
Some courts invoke special doctrines such as the "raw material supplier defense"
or the "bulk sales/sophisticated purchaser rule" to negate liability. These formulations recognize that component sellers who do not participate in the design of the
integrated product should not be liable merely because the components become
physically part of other products that are dangerously defective.
Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 2, § 10 cmt. a, at 28.
The "bulk supplier" defense posits that the seller of products in bulk ordinarily has
warning duties that extend only to its immediate vendee. See Werckenthein v. Bucher
Petrochemical Co., 618 N.E.2d 902, 908 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that defendant
manufacturers had adequately warned of product's dangers and were not obligated to
warn employees of an employer's particular use of the product). Under the "sophisticated
purchaser" or "sophisticated user" defense, "if the danger related to the particular
product is clearly known to the purchaser/employer, then there will be no obligation to
warn placed upon the supplier. Instead, it becomes the employer's responsibility to guard
against the known danger.... ." O'Neal v. Celanese Corp., 10 F.3d 249, 251 (4th Cir.
1993) (quoting Kennedy v. Mobay Corp., 579 A.2d 1191, 1196 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990)).
See also Charles E. Erway, III, The IngredientSupplier Defense, 16 J. PROD. & Toxics
LIAB. 269, 285-86 (1994) (defining "sophisticated purchaser" defense as relieving the
supplier of a hazardous product or substance of liability when the product or substance
is purchased by an industrial user and the supplier has reasonable grounds to believe
that the user is already aware of the hazards); discussion infra Parts II.A & B.
14.
Characterizing a naturally occurring raw material as defectively designed is
nonsensical. In most instances such a basic raw material is not susceptible to change,
i.e., copper is a defined element with immutable characteristics and cannot in any
sensible way be "redesigned." Therefore, as this Article notes, to impose warnings
obligations upon the sellers of basic raw materials makes little sense, either from a
practical or prudential standpoint. Cf Brown v. Superior Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 478 (Cal.
1988) ("While [defective equipment] might be 'redesigned' by the addition of safety
devices, there is no possibility for an alternative design for a drug like DES, which is
a scientific constant compounded in accordance with a required formula.").
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decisional and scholarly support exists for the common sense
conclusion that there are no "design alternatives" to raw materials. 5 As copper is copper, there can be no liability for defective design of it. Furthermore, the duty to warn is best placed
on those who alter the raw material and shape it into the
resulting product. They know best how to make the warnings
and are able to assure that those who need to be warned see
the warnings, read them, and understand them.
The Reporters' treatment of naturally occurring raw materials
shows substantial fidelity to more than thirty years of decisional law.'6 The Reporters conclude, as have the decisions upon
which they rely, that a raw material is not defective-upon
either a design or a warning rationale-simply through its
inclusion in an end-use product that causes injury or harm. 7
It is essential that the new Restatement be as explicit as
possible to retain this basic fabric of law. A suggestion for

15. See, e.g., Singleton v. Manitowoc Co., Inc., No. 90-1714, 1991 WL 64953, at **2
(4th Cir. Apr. 29, 1991) ("[A] defect is a condition of a product by which it does not
conform to recognized standards in the design of the product, recognized standards
imposed by society, or consumer expectations."); Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 2,
§ 10 cmt. c ("A basic raw material such as sand, gravel, or kerosine cannot be defectively designed.").
Manufacturing defects play no essential role in the analysis of potential products
liability for naturally occurring raw materials. A manufacturing defect is defined as "a
physical departure from a product's intended design that poses risks of harm to persons
or property." Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 1 cmt. a, at 1. As there is no
intended design of a raw material, there can be no departure from it.
16. See Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 2, § 10 reporters' note cmt. b. The
reporters' note states:
The issue is whether the seller of a component or raw material has a duty to
inform itself about specific applications ... and a further duty to determine
whether the buyer who will integrate it into another product is knowledgeable as
to the dangers attendant to that specific application. The Reporters have found
no cases imposing such an onerous duty.
Id. at 40.
17. See Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 2, § 11 cmt. a. The comment states that
when a product has a manufacturing defect.., it must also be established that,
had there been no defect, the harm to the plaintiff would have been avoided or
diminished. Similarly, if a product was defectively designed or was defective
because of inadequate instructions or warnings .... it must be established that,
had the product been properly designed or had the product been accompanied by
reasonable instructions or warnings, the harm to the plaintiff would have been
avoided or diminished. Moreover, the harm to the plaintiff must be of the sort that
was reasonably to be expected given the nature of the defect.
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improving the language of the Restatement is offered in the
Conclusion. This Article will show why a rationale for excluding
naturally occurring raw materials from potential products
liability is consistent with the doctrine's original purposes, as
well as the goals of deterrence, fairness, and judicial efficiency.

I. EARLY PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW-BEFORE
THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

Whether the issue is one of design or warnings, a predicate
to the application of products liability doctrine has always been
that the material implicated in plaintiffs suit be a "product."'8
Yet it does not follow that anything of physical mass that is
sold is potentially subject to a products liability claim for
personal injury, property damage, or economic loss accompanied
by other damages compensable in tort. 9 Two decades before the
1965 publication of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section
402A, California Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor made
clear that the basis for strict liability applied to products whose
marketing and use is routinely the result of production by
"valuable [trade] secrets," "sealed package[s]," "advertising,"
"marketing devices such as trade-marks," and a general consumer inability "to investigate for himself the soundness of
[the] product."2"

18.
See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962)
(stating that strict liability's purpose is "to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the
market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves").
19.
Cf Public Serv. Ind., Inc. v. Nichols, 494 N.E.2d 349, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)
(applying strict liability where electricity "had been reduced to consumption level and
passed through customer meters"). But cf. Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds,
765 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. 1988) (holding a power company was not subject to strict
liability for injuries caused by contact with high-voltage power lines because the
electricity, while considered a "product," did not reach the consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it was sold); Wyrulec Co. v. Schutt, 866 P.2d 756, 761
(Wyo. 1993) (holding that an electrical utility company could not be strictly liable where
a roofer was injured after touching electrical wires because "electricity is a service and
not a product").
In contrast, it generally has been held that in the law of trespass and nuisance, no
such threshold showing of "consumable form" applies. See generallyGERALD W. BOSTON
& M. STUART MADDEN, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND Toxic TORTS: CASES, MATERIALS
AND PROBLEMS 28-37 (1994).

20. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring). Justice Traynor saw the need for strict products liability for
mismanufactured products-products that did not conform to the manufacturer's own
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Two decades later, Justice Traynor commanded a majority of
the California Supreme Court for his modern expression of a
rule of strict liability for the sale of defective products that
injure a user. In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,Inc.,21 the
California Supreme Court stated:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he
places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to a human being.

...To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that plaintiff proved that he was injured while using
the Shopsmith in a way it was intended to be used as a
result of a defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that made the Shopsmith unsafe for its
intended use.2 2
As the New York Court of Appeals in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.23 had done many years earlier, the Greenman court
supported its new doctrine with authority derived from cases
involving merchantability and fitness for consumption or
intimate bodily application, such as food, cosmetics, or toiletries.24 Read together, the court found that the earlier holdings
shared common characteristics: "Recognized first in the case of
unwholesome food products, such liability has now been extended to a variety of other products that create as great or greater
hazards if defective." 25 As examples, the court referenced
decisions involving soda bottles, vaccines, insect spray, a
surgical pin, a skirt, an automobile, an automobile tire, a home

specifications, such as a reusable soda bottle. Justice Traynor observed, "As handicrafts
have been replaced by mass production ... the close relationship between the producer
and consumer of a product has been altered." Id. Thus, the liability envisioned by
Justice Traynor, the eventual author of Greenman, was for mass-produced items, i.e.,
chattels or personal property. Neither the decision's rationale, nor its focus, were
directed at mass-produced naturally occurring raw materials.
21.
377 P.2d 897 (1962).
22.
Id. at 900-01.
23.
111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y 1916).
24.
See Greenman, 377 P.2d at 899-901.
25.
Id. at 900.
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permanent, hair dye, and an airplane.2 6 Justice Traynor's emphasis on tire, auto, clothing, and toiletry cases to inaugurate
a new doctrine of strict products liability shows that the
products liability obligation was not intended to reach materials
that were sold without substantial finishing or processing.

II. THE TREATMENT OF NATURALLY OCCURRING RAW
MATERIALS UNDER THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

Two years after Greenman, the American Law Institute (the
ALI) published the Restatement (Second)of Torts. Under section
402A, the decisional law has continued to lend substantial support to the conclusion that the purpose of products liability
doctrine is to protect consumers from unreasonable risks of
harm caused by manufactured or processed products.27 Modern
decisions continue to send the same message: the principal
target of products liability law is "item[s]" on a "product line,"28
or "chattel[s], " 29 which are defined in one dictionary as "moveable item[s] of personal property.""

26.
See id. at 900-01 (citing Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962) (hula
skirt); Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960) (surgical pin); B.F.
Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959) (automobile tire); Thompson
v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (automobile); McQuaide v. Bridgeport
Brass Co., 190 F. Supp. 252 (D. Conn. 1960) (insect spray); Hinton v. Republic Aviation
Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (airplane); Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc.,
11 Cal. Rptr. 823 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (soda bottle); Gottsdanker v. Cutter Lab., 6 Cal.
Rptr. 320 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (vaccine); Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 269 P.2d 413
(Kan. 1954) (hair dye); Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 149 N.E.2d 181 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1958) (home permanent)).
27.

See 1 M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6.1, at 192 & n.12 (2d ed.

1988) (listing decisions in which 33 jurisdictions have adopted strict liability for defective
products).
28.
Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 304 (Cal. 1994) (involving motor
vehicle crashworthiness).
29.
Armstrong v. Cione, 738 P.2d 79, 82 (Haw. 1987) (finding insufficient plaintiffs
strict liability claim for injury from a plate glass shower door in apartment because door
was part of the premises rather than a product). As the court explained:
[T]he public interest in human life and safety requires the maximum possible
protection that the law can muster against [defective products] ... and that the
burden of accidental injuries caused by defective chattels should be placed upon
those in the chain of distribution as a cost of doing business and as [a deterrent).
Id. at 82 (first alteration in original) (quoting Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 470
P.2d 240, 243 (Haw. 1970)).
30.

WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 242 (2d College ed. 1980). In the regulated

areas, such as medical devices, federal regulations impose requirements upon the
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The discussion that follows describes the two principles that
commonly control the treatment of naturally occurring raw
materials. First, when there is a change in the material over
which the supplier has neither knowledge nor control, there is
no liability for the supplier.3 Second, there is de jure or de facto
immunity 2 for sellers of such raw materials, pursuant to the
alternative conclusions that either such materials are definitionally excluded from potential liability or, on the facts of the
case, doctrines such as the sophisticated purchaser defense or
the bulk supplier defense preclude liability.

A. Uncontrolled Change in Products Results in No Duty

For design or warnings liability alike, the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A(1)(b) requires that a product sold
"must be 'expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold.' "" The "without substantial change" predicate to section
402A is explained in comment p:
Thus far the decisions applying the rule stated have not
gone beyond products which are sold in the condition, or in
substantially the same condition, in which they are expected
to reach the hands of the ultimate user or consumer. In the
absence of decisions providing a clue to the rules which are
likely to develop, the Institute has refrained from taking any
position as to the possible liability of the seller where the
product is expected to, and does, undergo further processing

"finished device." Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing 21
C.F.R. § 820.20(a) (1996)). Cf. Schaffer v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 74 F.3d
722, 729 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[Tlhere is no duty to warn extending to the speculative
anticipation of how manufactured components, not in and of themselves dangerous or
defective, can become potentially dangerous dependent upon their integration into a unit
designed and assembled by another." (citation omitted)). If there is no liability for the
manufacturer of the component part in the latter setting, it follows a fortiori that there
should be no liability for the seller of the naturally occurring raw material, the
relationship of which to the finished product is at an even greater remove.
31. See infra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
32. See supra note 7; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 416, 425 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining de jure as "[o]f right" and "as a matter of right," and de facto as "[i]n fact, in
deed, actually").
33. States S.S. Co. v. Stone Manganese Marine, Ltd., 371 F. Supp. 500, 505 (D.N.J.
1973) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
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or other substantial change after it leaves his hands and
before it reaches those of the ultimate user or consumer.3 4
This comment is instructive: In effect, the ALI took a position
with respect to raw materials such as pigiron. The comment
noted that in the case of a raw material "capable of a wide
variety of uses," responsibility shifts. If the "ultimate user"
manufactures a child's tricycle with the pigiron, and the pigiron
is unsuitable for that purpose, liability is imposed on the party
that manufactured the tricycle, not. on the supplier of the
pigiron. 35 The comment also clearly stated that when material
sold in bulk is itself defective, and that defect causes a harm,
liability indeed may be imposed on the supplier.36
Thus comment p proposes that no liability should attach to the
seller of raw materials having multiple end uses, the selection
of which is beyond the seller's control. In harmony with this is
the "no duty" rule adopted by courts considering claims involving
bulk sales of substances incapable of being labeled at the time
of their unfinished and initial introduction into commerce. For

34.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. p (1965). The comment provides

further:
It seems reasonably clear that the mere fact that the product is to undergo
processing, or other substantial change, will not in all cases relieve the seller of
liability under the rule stated in this Section. If, for example, raw coffee beans are
sold to a buyer who roasts and packs them for sale to the ultimate consumer, it
cannot be supposed that the seller will be relieved of all liability when the raw
beans are contaminated with arsenic, or some other poison.. . .On the other hand,
the manufacturer of pigiron, which is capable of a wide variety of uses, is not so
likely to be held to strict liability when it turns out to be unsuitable for the child's
tricycle into which it is finally made by a remote buyer. The question is essentially
one of whether the responsibility for discovery and prevention of the dangerous
defect is shifted to the intermediate party who is to make the changes. No doubt
there will be some situations, and some defects, as to which the responsibility will
be shifted, and others in which it will not. The existing decisions as yet throw no
light upon the questions, and the Institute therefore expresses neither approval
nor disapproval of the seller's strict liability in such a case.
Id. See generally Gene M. Williams & Greg German, The Liability of Raw Material
Manufacturers:It's Time To Restate the Restatement, 43 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q.
23, 24-25 (1992).
See, e.g., Pennwalt Corp. v. Superior Ct., 218 Cal. Rptr. 675,677 (Ct. App. 1985)
35.
(finding bulk chemical manufacturer not liable to ultimate consumer injured in explosion
caused by careless compounding of chemicals that had been repackaged, relabeled and
resold by distributor and retailer over which manufacturer had no control); Jones v.
Hittle Serv., Inc., 549 P.2d 1383, 1394 (Kan. 1976) (holding that a manufacturer who
sells its product to a trained and capable distributor who is familiar with the product
owes no duty to warn the ultimate consumer).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. p (1965).
36.
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example, in Groll v. Shell Oil Co.,"7 a suit brought against the
bulk supplier of the chemical BT-67, which had been incorporated into store and lantern fuel, the plaintiff was burned while
trying to light a fire. Finding no liability for failure to warn, the
court concluded that a bulk supplier's duty to warn simply does
not arise absent "tangible items that could be labeled, or sent
into the chain of commerce with the manufacturer's instructions."3 8

Accordingly, this practical proposition that a supplier should
not be responsible for change to a product outside of its control
supports the general approach in the Restatement (Second).39
Naturally occurring raw materials are sold in bulk to intermediary fabricators or processors; they are not "sold in the condition,
or substantially the same condition, in40 which it is expected to
reach the ultimate user or consumer."
B. De Jure and De Facto Immunity

In the thirty years following publication of section 402A,
judicial decisions have followed two paths toward excluding raw
materials sellers from design or warnings liability--de jure
immunity or de facto immunity.4 ' De jure immunity is granted
by decisions that find, expressly or implicitly, that certain
transactions in naturally occurring raw materials are not the
products that the authors of the Restatement (Second)envisioned
as properly subject to strict liability.4 2

37.
196 Cal. Rptr. 52 (Ct. App. 1983).
Id. at 55. See also Werckenthein v. Bucher Petrochemical Co., 618 N.E.2d 902,
38.
908-09 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that where suppliers of chemicals in bulk had
warned of consequences of prolonged exposure, and a chemist failed to follow the
industry practice for testing such a chemical, manufacturer does not breach duty to warn
by failing to provide a specific precaution against chemist's practice of sniffing directly
from the container); House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 554 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) ("A bulk supplier of raw materials which are not themselves inherently dangerous
has no duty to warn ultimate users of the manufactured product."), affd, 1996 WL
714611 (Utah, Dec. 13, 1996); cf. Jones, 549 P.2d at 1393 (noting that "[a] bulk supplier
... is in an entirely different position from one who sells packaged commodities or who
deals directly with the consumer").
39.
See Leon v. Caterpillar Indus., Inc., 69 F.3d 1326, 1338 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming jury verdict for manufacturer in a forklift operator's strict liability action against
manufacturer where manufacturer interposed the defense that retailer's faulty installation of a deadman's switch was the proximate cause of the accident).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. d (1965).
40.
See supra notes 7, 32 and accompanying text.
41.
42.
Cf. Edward M. Mansfield, Reflections on CurrentLimits on Component andRaw
MaterialSupplier Liability and the Proposed Third Restatement, 84 KY. L.J. 221, 231
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De facto immunity is granted by decisions that state that a
raw material supplier in a particular case had no duty to warn
because either the buyer was a sophisticated or a professional
user and did not need to be warned;4 3 or the buyer was in a
superior position to know of the end use to which the product
would be devoted and was in a better position than the raw
material supplier to identify what warnings were needed and
to make them." Distinguishable in degree from both the bulk
supplier and the component supplier defenses, the raw material
supplier defense (sometimes aptly termed the ingredient supplier defense)4 5 posits that the manufacturer's "end" product no
longer is the "material" that the raw material or ingredient
supplier originally sold.46 This distinction turns upon the supplier's position not only that it has no control over packaging of the
end product (a limitation that is common with bulk suppliers),
but also that it has no control over the form or composition of
the end product itself. As such, the raw material or ingredient
supplier participates neither in the risk creation nor in the risk

(1995-96) ("A raw material by definition is of value to society precisely because it can
be adapted to a wide variety of applications.... That does not mean that they are 'safe'
in all applications; no material is."). See generally Williams & German, supra note 34,
at 25 n.8 (arguing that the precondition in section 402A(1)(a) that the "'seller' engage
'in the business of selling such a product'" should operate to "exclude bulk suppliers
from liability because they do not sell finished 'products' ").
43.
See, e.g., Kalinowski v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 851 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.
Pa. 1994). In discussing the sophisticated user doctrine, the court commented that
the "Sophisticated User" defense does not absolve the bulk supplier of the duty to
warn ultimate users. Rather, applying § 388 [comment n] of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts simply permits the court to find that such supplier discharged
its duty by reasonably relying upon the intermediary to convey appropriate
warnings to the ultimate users.
Id. at 157.
See Smith v. Walter C. Best, Inc., 927 F.2d 736, 741-42 (3rd Cir. 1990) (affirm44.
ing the district court's grant of summary judgment in a silicosis case based upon the
sophisticated purchaser defense); see also Kenneth M. Willner, Note, Failuresto Warn
and the Sophisticated UserDefense, 74 VA. L. REV. 579, 589 (1988) (noting that under
the sophisticated user defense "sellers act reasonably if they do not warn intermediate
purchasers of dangers of which the intermediate purchasers are already knowledgeable").
45.
See Erway, supra note 13, at 269 ("[An ingredient supplier provides a raw
material or substance, such as a potentially hazardous chemical, to manufacturing
companies that create their own products.').
46.
See id. In raising this defense the ingredient or raw material seller argues that
"the manufacturer's end product, whatever it may be, is not the same 'product' as what
the ingredient supplier sold." Id. After all, any substance can be hazardous. As the 16thcentury physician Paracelsus stated: "'What is it that is not poison? All things are
poison and none without poison. Only the dose determines that a thing is not poison.'"
Erway, supra note 13, at 273 (citation omitted).
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reduction, if any, of the finished product. As a practical matter,
the buyer of the raw materials should make the warnings to the
end user because it is in the best position to do it. One simply
cannot put warning tags on bulk pigiron, copper, steel, or lead.
The rationale unifying these theories is that knowledgeable
purchasers are "in a far better position to communicate an
effective warning to the ultimate user."4 7 The rule has been
applied in a variety of situations involving eventual finished
products such as capacitors in dataphones" made from bulk
materials such as silica. 9

47.
Sara Lee Corp. v. Homasote Co., 719 F. Supp. 417, 422 (D. Md. 1989) (finding
that a supplier of polystyrene beads to a manufacturer of board insulation was in the
best position to warn user).
Between the ingredient supplier and the downstream formulator, the supportable
conclusion is that the downstream formulator, with its superior knowledge of the
product's eventual use, is responsible for ultimate design, formulation, packaging, risk
information, and marketing. See, e.g., George v. Parke-Davis, 733 P.2d 507, 515-16
(Wash. 1987) (finding no liability in an indemnification action brought by a pharmaceutical company against the supplier of the active ingredient diethylstilbestrol
(DES)). Finding no liability for the ingredient supplier, the court explained:
DES is not inherently harmful, and still is prescribed today for ailments not
associated with pregnant women. Thus, it is the way in which DES is used, and
not DES per se, which is harmful. Furthermore, the [FDA] requires the tablet
manufacturers and not the bulk manufacturers, to account for and warn of a drug's
properties. It would therefore be anomalous to require the raw [ingredient]
manufacturer to conduct separate tests to determine the adverse effects of the drug
when by federal statute, the tablet manufacturer bears this responsibility.
Id. at 515 (citation omitted). Shell Oil Co. v. Harrison,425 So. 2d 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982), involved a suit brought against the manufacturer of the chemical DBCP, which
was sold to a formulator who used it as an ingredient of a soil fumigant claimed to have
injured the ultimate users of the fumigants. See id. at 68-69. Rejecting the proposition
that Shell had a nondelegable duty to warn ultimate users of the hazards of its products
that were ingredients in different products made by other companies, the court stated
that "labeling and packaging requirements necessarily differ depending upon the
particular [end product] formulation and, thus, place the responsibility on the formulator
for providing adequate warning to the public. . . ."Id. at 70. White v. Weiner, 562 A-2d
378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), affld, 583 A.2d 789 (Pa. 1991), involved a suit brought against
Eli Lilly & Co., a bulk supplier of pharmaceutical chemicals, for failure to provide
warnings on the chemical compound protamine sulfate. The chemical compound was
supplied in bulk to the Upjohn Co., who employed it as an ingredient in a prescription
drug. See id. at 379. The Pennsylvania court held that Eli Lilly had no tort duty to warn
the end user, inasmuch as the end product producer was in a superior position to assess
risks and decide upon the form and content of adequate labeling and instructions. See
id. at 385-86.
48.
See Rivers v. AT & T Tech., Inc., 554 N.YS.2d 401, 403-05 (App. Div. 1990)
(granting summary judgment in a products liability action for the supplier of
dimethylformamide, or DMF, an ingredient in dataphone capacitors alleged to have
caused or contributed to a woman's death).
49.
See, e.g., Smith v. Walter C. Best, Inc., 927 F.2d 736, 741-42 (3d Cir. 1990)
(recognizing, under Ohio law, a sophisticated purchaser defense to purchaser's employees' silicosis claims); Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214-15 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding that
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Accordingly, in many raw materials warnings cases, courts
have held that a manufacturer either need not provide warnings
to a buyer sophisticated in the risks of product use or in control
of further processing, or may predicate such warnings as are
provided upon reasonable expectations that the knowledgeable
purchaser will act in ways consistent with his knowledge of
product risks and handling.5 ° As the court stated in O'Neal v.
Celanese Corp.," "if the danger ...

is clearly known to the

purchaser/employer, then there will be no obligation to warn
placed upon the supplier.... Stated another way, when the
supplier has reason to believe that the purchaser ...

will

recognize the danger associated with the product, no warnings
are mandated."52 In Phillips v. A. P. Green Refractories Co.,5

involving silica, a Pennsylvania Superior Court held that under
Pennsylvania law the sophisticated user defense was available
in strict products liability actions as well as those brought in
negligence.54 As applied to bulk sales, at least one court has
interpreted the sophisticated purchaser rule as obliging the bulk
seller to confine its sales to such knowledgeable buyers. The
Tenth Circuit in Mason v. Texaco, Inc.," reversing a verdict for

the plaintiff, stated that Kansas law:
imposes upon the bulk seller the obligation to sell only to
knowledgeable and responsible distributors. lIt] does not
impose a duty on the bulk seller to warn the ultimate
consumer, and specifically does not impose a duty on the
a supplier of silica had no duty to warn a purchaser's employees of dangers where the
purchaser had extensive knowledge of the hazards of silica).
50.
See Prather v. Upjohn Co., 797 F.2d 923, 924 (11th Cir. 1986) ("The evidence
at trial showed that Upjohn sold its polyurethane foam exclusively to knowledgeable
industrial consumers. The warnings Upjohn issued concerning the potential hazards of
burning the foam were therefore designed accordingly.'); Hegna v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 825 F. Supp. 880, 884 (D. Minn. 1993) ("It is now undisputed that Vitek
[manufacturer of plaintiffs TMJ implants] knew both the properties of DuPont's PTFE
and the scientific community's concerns regarding the use of PTFE-based materials to
make implants such as the TMJ implant.').
51.
10 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 1993).
52.
Id. at251 (quoting Kennedy v. MobayCorp., 579A.2d 1191, 1196 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1990)).
53.
630 A.2d 874 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
54.
See id. at 882; see also Jackson v. Reliable Paste & Chem. Co., 483 N.E.2d 939,
942-43 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (finding that a supplier of methanol, an ingredient of
manufacturer's finished product, owed no duty to warn of methanol's dangers as the
manufacturer knew of the chemical's explosive and flammable propensities).
55.
862 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1988).
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bulk seller to police the adequacy of warnings given by the
distributor.5 6

C. PriorDecisions Involving Naturally
OccurringRaw Materials

1. Generally-As suggested, the decisions declining to confer
"product" status upon basic naturally occurring raw materials
have hewn consistently to the logical proposition that the raw
material seller is so distanced from knowledge of the product's
end uses or their attendant risks as to be unable to detect them,
to avoid them, or to secure insurance to spread the risks.5 7
Representative of such decisions is one in which the basic raw
material is in transit to the manufacturer in anticipation of
product fabrication and an injury occurs during this intermediate stage. In Spellmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser Corp.,5 8 plaintiff, a

56. Id. at 246; see also Jones v. Hittle Serv., Inc., 549 P.2d 1383, 1394 (Kan. 1976)
(holding that the bulk seller "fulfills his duty to the ultimate consumer when he
ascertains that the distributor to whom he sells is adequately trained, is familiar with
the properties of the [propane] gas and safe methods of handling it, and is capable of
passing on his knowledge to his customers").
57. See Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 2, § 10 cmt. c. Comment c provides:
Raw materials.... The manufacturer of the integrated product has a significant
comparative advantage regarding selection of materials to be used. Raw-materials
sellers are accordingly not subject to liability for harm caused by defective design
of the end-product. The same considerations apply to failure-to-warn claims against
sellers of raw materials. To impose a duty to warn would require the seller to
develop expertise regarding a multitude of different end-products and to investigate
the actual use of raw materials by manufacturers over whom the supplier has no
control. Courts uniformly refuse to impose such an onerous duty to warn.
Id.
A seller's efficient procurement of insurance turns upon its ability to anticipate risk
with some level of reliability. See, e.g., 2 MADDEN, supra note 27, § 25.1:
In purchasing products liability insurance, the.., seller seeks to exchange an
uncertain risk, that of potential future actionable incidents involving its products,
for a certain cost, that of annual premiums .... [T]he offering of insurance and
the setting of premiums for liability insurance is based upon the carrier's actuarial
projection of what the insured's overall losses may be expected to be .... For a risk
to be insurable it must, therefore, be "specified or capable of identification," and
the duration of the risk must be fixed or determinable.
Id. (citation omitted).
58.
544 P.2d 107 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975).
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longshoreman, brought a personal injury suit against a manufacturer alleging that it failed to prepare wood pulp bales
properly for shipping, so that plaintiff was injured when struck
by bales that fell from a disintegrating eight-bale module.59 The
court granted Weyerhaeuser summary judgment on the strict
liability count:
Imposition of strict liability is premised on the sound policy
consideration that the manufacturer who markets his
product for use and consumption by the general public is
best able to bear the risk of loss resulting from a defective
product. The thrust of Section 402A is, accordingly, to
protect the "ultimate user or consumer" of the product....
In the instant case, Weyerhaeuser produced and packaged
a raw material in an intermediate state, which was stored
awaiting shipment to another processor. It did not harm or
endanger any "ultimate user or consumer"; only expert
loaders and expert carriers were required to deal with it. We
therefore conclude that, because of the character of the
"product" and the status of the plaintiff, the policy considerations which support imposition of strict liability in other
contexts are too severely diluted here and dismissal was
correct as to the strict liability theory.60
Seller incapacity to anticipate, and therefore to affect, end-use
risks provided the basis for defendant's judgment in Pennwalt
Corp. v. Superior Court.6 That suit arose from injuries an
eighteen-year-old plaintiff suffered while attempting to compound chemicals at home to create fireworks. The raw materials
at issue included sodium chlorate, aluminum powder, and
sulphur. Plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer,
distributor, and retailer of each chemical.6 2 The California
appeals court held that the manufacturer of the chemicals
should not be liable to plaintiff for the sale of a chemical that
had been repackaged, relabeled, and distributed through a
retailer over which the manufacturer had no control.63 The court
explained:

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See id. at 108.
Id. at 109-10.
218 Cal. Rptr. 675 (Ct. App. 1985).
See id. at 675.
See id. at 677.
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Sodium Chlorate has many legitimate uses, some of which
involve using it in conjunction with other chemicals.
Pennwalt cannot be expected to anticipate every possible use
and issue warnings of any potential danger involved in each
such use. To hold otherwise would place an impossible
burden on a bulk manufacturer which would be tantamount
to imposing absolute liability for injury resulting from the
use of a product not claimed to be otherwise defective."
Another California case, Walker v. Stauffer Chemical Corp.,65
involved a plaintiff who was injured seriously by a drain cleaner
explosion. The cleaner contained sulfuric acid. With respect to
the supplier of the sulfuric acid, the court made this observation:
We are referred to no California case, nor has independent
research revealed any such, extending the strict liability of
the manufacturer (seller) to the supplier of a substance to
be used in compounding or formulating the product which
eventually causes injury to an ultimate consumer. On the
contrary this dearth of authority indicates to us a reluctance
on the part of the bench and bar to consider such an extenor desirable for the protection of the ultimate
sion necessary
66
consumer.
The Walker court explained that no public policy interest could
be found for imposing liability upon a supplier of a non-defective
ingredient: "The ultimate product ...can in no way be considered to be one and the same [as the] bulk sulfuric acid manufactured by Stauffer ....,,6 The court further explained:
We see no compelling reason for an extension [of strict
liability] to a situation such as presented in the instant
case.... We do not believe it realistically feasible or necessary to the protection of the public to require the manufacturer and supplier of a standard chemical ingredient ...not
having control over the subsequent compounding, packaging
or marketing of an item eventually causing injury to the

64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
96 Cal. Rptr. 803 (Ct. App. 1971).
Id. at 805-06.
Id. at 805.
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ultimate consumer, to bear the responsibility for that injury.

The manufacturer (seller) of the product causing the injury
is so situated as to afford the necessary protection.68
2. Asbestos-The No Duty Rule in Action-Cases involving
asbestos are not an exception to the "no duty" rule, but rather
illustrate the application of the rule. In asbestos cases, the
processor-not the mining company-is liable, because it is in
the best position to warn of the hazards. For example, in Menna
v. Johns-Manville Corp.,69 an asbestos personal injury suit, the
district court concluded that even though asbestos was a product
for purposes of strict liability, the person in the best position to
warn of its hazards-in this case the processor who formed the
asbestos into its end use product-had the duty to warn of its
hazards.70 "Thus, as with the raw coffee beans in [Restatement
(Second)] comment p, there is no justification for shifting
responsibility for the harms of asbestos from defendant processors to Owens-Corning."7 '
Decisions like Menna may best be seen as consistent with the
rule that suppliers of naturally occurring raw materials have no
duty to warn processors of obvious dangers. If products such as
asbestos always are considered dangerous, then the duty to
warn is discharged best by the party who knows the end use and
how best to convey the warning to the end user.
III. NATURALLY OCCURRING RAW MATERIALS
UNDER THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

A. Generally
Section 2 of the Restatement (Third) Tentative Draft No. 2
establishes standards for determining product defectiveness. For
purposes of determining the liability of a commercial seller or
distributor for harm caused by defective products:

68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 806.
585 F. Supp. 1178 (D.N.J. 1984).
See id. at 1182.
Id. at 1183.
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(a) a product contains a manufacturing defect when the
product departs from its intended design even though all
possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product;
(b) a product is defective in design when the foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced
or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design
by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe;
(c) a product is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed
by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the
provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller
or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial
chain of distribution, and the omission of the instructions or
warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.72
The language of section 2(b) itself militates against its application to naturally occurring raw materials. As a practical matter,
a raw material such as iron, aluminum, or copper has demonstrated its utility through generations of application in uses that
require its specific physical propensities, such as weight,
strength, conductivity, or otherwise. The entire concept of a
"design" alternative would be distorted into unrecognizability if
it were imagined that availability of an altered product, such as
one that is no longer iron, or copper, or aluminum, was a
feasible design alternative within the meaning of section 2(b).
Concerning warnings and instructions, section 2(c)'s provision
that warnings liability will arise where "the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided
by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the
seller"73 does not apply to the commercial and production
processes of naturally occurring raw materials. The Walker
court's commentary, noting the futility of imposing upon raw
materials suppliers an obligation to inform themselves of all
possible end product uses, and to provide warnings concerning
potentially hazardous uses, is illustrative.7 4

72.
73.
74.

Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2.
Id.
See Walker, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
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Regarding sales to intermediaries, under the Restatement
(Third)Tentative Draft No. 2, the conventional rule regarding
a seller's informational obligation to remote-often workplace-users continues. In the Reporters' words:
There is no general rule as to whether one supplying a
product for the use of others through an intermediary has
a duty to warn the ultimate product user directly or may
rely on the intermediary to relay warnings. The standard is
one of reasonableness in the circumstances. Among the
factors to be considered are the gravity of the risks posed by
the product, the likelihood that the intermediary will convey
the information to the ultimate user, and the feasibility and
effectiveness of giving a warning directly to the user.75
The draft Restatement's preservation of the so-called "open and
obvious" rule supports the proposal that a duty to warn does not
attach to naturally occurring raw materials. As the Reporters
state: "In general, no duty exists to warn or instruct regarding
risks and risk avoidance measures that should be obvious to, or
generally known by, foreseeable product users .... Warning of
an obvious or generally known risk in most instances will not
provide an effective additional measure of safety."76 Persons who
buy the materials know of the risks, and they are aware of the
relative conductivity of copper, the brittleness of iron, or the
weight/load bearing qualities of aluminum.

B. The Reporters and Raw Materials

The Reporters' commentary provides support for practical and
theoretical contentions that strict products liability is confined
to manufactured, finished products. The Introductory Note to the
Restatement (Third)Tentative Draft No. 2 signals a conforming
interpretation in promising that "Topic 1 consists of seven
sections and covers the general subject of product defect for the
vast majority of manufactured products."7 7 Read in its totality,
the Reporters' comment to section 1 bolsters that conclusion.

75.
76.
77.

Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. h.
Id. § 2 cmt. i.
Id. at xxvii (emphasis added).
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Although the Reporters recognize that "[mlost courts treat raw
materials as products for the purposes of strict products liability
in tort, provided that the injury resulted from an identifiable
defect in the raw material,""8 they make this comment:
Raw Materials.Product components include raw materials.
...
Thus, when raw materials are contaminated or otherwise defective ... the seller of the raw materials is subject
to liability for harm caused by such defects .... A basic raw
material such as sand, gravel, or kerosine cannot be defectively designed. If there is an inappropriate decision in the
use of such materials, the failing is not attributable to the
supplier of the raw materials, but rather to the fabricator
that put them to use. The manufacturer of the integrated
product has a significant comparative advantage regarding
selection of materials to be used. Raw-materials sellers are
accordingly not subject to liability for harm caused by
defective design of the end-product. The same considerations
apply to failure-to-warn claims against sellers of raw materials. To impose a duty to warn would require the seller to
develop expertise regarding a multitude of different endproducts and to investigate the actual use of raw materials
by manufacturers over whom the supplier has no control.7 9
In an illustration to section 10 of the Restatement (Third)
Tentative Draft No. 3 the Reporters hypothesize:
LMN Sand Co. sells sand in bulk. ABC Construction Co.
purchases sand to use in mixing cement. LMN is aware that
the improper mixture of its sand with other ingredients can
cause cement containing the sand to crack. ABC utilizes
LMN's sand to form a supporting column in a building. As
a result of improper mixture the cement column cracks and
gives way during a mild earthquake and causes injury to the
building's occupants. LMN is not liable to the injured occupants. The sand sold by LMN is not defective in itself ....
LMN has no duty to warn ABC about improperly mixing
sand for use in cement. LMN does not participate in ABC's
design of the cement and is not subject to liability for harm
caused by the sand as integrated into the cement .... 8

78.
79.
80.

Id. § 4 reporter's note cmt. b, at 148 (emphasis added).
Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 2, § 10 cmt. c.
Id. § 10 cmt. c, illus. 6.
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The rationale of this illustration is that liability attaches only
where the "raw material" supplier has engaged in conduct that
went beyond the normal activity of a raw material supplier, i.e.,
has participated in the design of the cement. The illustration
lends support for a "no duty" rule for suppliers of merchantable
naturally occurring raw materials.

IV. MODERN RATIONALES FOR THE NATURALLY OCCURRING
RAW MATERIAL No DUTY RULE

The question remains: Can a no duty rule for naturally
occurring raw materials be harmonized with the goals of modern
products liability law? While there are expressions without
number of what these goals are, one effective expression was
made by the California Supreme Court in Brown v. Superior
Court."'In that decision, the California court, the founding court
of modern strict products liability, 2 identified the "fundamental
reasons" for the application of modern products liability: "to
deter manufacturers from marketing products that are unsafe,
and to spread the cost of injury from the plaintiff to the consuming public, which will pay a higher price for the product to
reflect the increased expense of insurance to the manufacturer
83
resulting from its greater exposure to liability."
Consistent with the language of Brown, legal commentators
have developed rationales of "deterrence"84 and "efficiency"8 5 as
important, although not exclusive, rationales for modern

81.

751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).

82.

See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962); see also

supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
83.
Brown, 751 P.2d at 478.
84. See M. Stuart Madden, The Vital Common Law: Its Role in a StatutoryAge, 18
U. ARK. LIrrLE ROCK L.J. 555, 584-85 (1996) (quoting various commentators); see also
O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 144 (1881) ("The true explanation of the reference
of liability to a moral standard... [is] that it is to give a man a fair chance to avoid
doing the harm before he is held responsible for it.").
85. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096-97 (1972)
(suggesting that in "particular contexts like accidents or pollution [costs should be
placed] on the party or activity which can most cheaply avoid them"). The Calabresi and
Melamed approach influenced the Ninth Circuit in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d
558 (9th Cir. 1974), an oil pollution case. The court stated: "In determining whether the
cost of an accident should be borne by the injured party or be shifted, in whole or in
part, this [efficiency] approach requires the court to fix the identity of the party who can
avoid the costs most cheaply." Id. at 569.
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products liability. Even assuming that each of these tort rationales enjoy a robust following today, a Restatement (Third) "no
duty" rule would represent sound policy. If those who mined
copper or lead or fabricated steel were strictly liable for harms
caused by end-use products, insurance would be either unavailable or enormously costly. Those saddled with the task of
actuarially determining a proper rate would be faced with "open
skies" liability because they would not know what products
would eventually be made. Delineating a rational starting point
for or cessation of potential liability would be impossible. By way
of contrast, an insurer for the end-use product producer can look
at and evaluate based on history and rational projections
insurance risks of end-use products. Information on liability
costs, past and projected, is crucial to carriers seeking to make
coverage decisions and to set premiums. This information is
available to the manufacturer of the end product, while it is
normally unavailable to the supplier of raw materials potentially
suited to a large number of potential end uses. Thus the raw
materials manufacturer, if subject to potential liability for
harms caused by products in which the material ultimately was
an ingredient, could never procure liability insurance in an
informed and cost effective way. In terms of efficiency, insurance
becomes less expensive, and the raw materials supplier and the
end use manufacturer avoid duplicating insurance coverage. It
is seen that the risk distribution rationale mentioned in Brown 6
belies the imposition of products liability on suppliers of raw
materials.
The tort goal of deterrence is in no way compromised by
application of a "no duty" rule to mere suppliers of merchantable raw materials. A residual duty of reasonableness exists in
the supplier's duty to supply what has been ordered. If a
standard grade of copper is ordered and what is supplied is
contaminated or a different grade and an injury results, the
raw material supplier should be subject to liability. Likewise,
if a raw material supplier goes beyond its traditional role and
actively participates in the manufacturing process, its conduct
should be judged on the basis of a reasonableness standard.
Both of the aforementioned duties provide the raw materials
supplier with an incentive to conduct its business consistent
with a standard of reasonableness, and to avoid harmful
behavior.

86.

751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
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But deterrence only works if behavior exists that can be
encouraged or prevented.87 Case law ranging from the most
inchoate early rules to the most modern analyses have suggested that the manufacturer of the product, and not the raw
material supplier, is in the best position to prevent an accident
or injury. First, the manufacturer is a knowledgeable purchaser, usually industrial, and is aware of the problems that a raw
material can cause. Second, the manufacturer alone knows
about its products, as well as who is likely to use them. The
manufacturer is in the appropriate position to formulate warnings and to design its product so as to prevent injury. If it is
impossible to prevent some risks, the draft Restatement requires
manufacturers to warn about them, unless they involve hazards
that everybody knows about.88
Deterrence works best when it is selective and focused. This
essential products liability rationale supports limiting the
obligations of suppliers of raw materials to what they are
equipped and motivated to do best, and places responsibility for
product risks finally and clearly upon the manufacturers of the
product that caused the harm.
Criticisms of the proposed Restatement (Third) provisions
pertaining to liability of suppliers of raw materials have ranged
from those who say it extends too far to others claiming that it
does not go far enough to limit liability. Professor Mark
McLaughlin Hager appears to criticize any rule that would limit
duty to reasonably foreseeable dangers, 89 and states, "There
should be no defense of unforeseeable use if the harm in
question would also arise from foreseeable use."9 °
In contrast, Edward M. Mansfield, a practitioner who has
studied this particular area of law, observes that even "if a

87.
See HOLMES, supra note 84, at 144. The goal of deterrence has seemingly been
tort law's perpetual and faithful companion. As early as 1890 an academic author wrote
of the goals of the negligence action in these words: "The really important matter is to
adjust the dispute between the parties by a rule of conduct which shall do justice if
possible in the particular case, but which shall also be suitable to the needs of the
community, and tend to prevent like accidents from happening in future." William
Schofield, Davies v. Mann: Theory of ContributoryNegligence, 3 HARV. L. REv. 263, 269
(1890).
88.
See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. i ("In general, no duty exists
to warn or instruct regarding risks or risk avoidance measures that should be obvious
to, or generally known by, foreseeable product users.").
89.
See Mark McLaughlin Hager, Don't Say I Didn't Warn You (Even Though I
Didn't):Why the Pro-DefendantConsensuson WarningLaw is Wrong, 61 TENN. L. REV.
1125, 1134-49 (1994).
90.
Id. at 1149.
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multi-purpose raw material.. . is hazardous only as used in a
particular type of finished product, legal responsibility rests
with the finished product manufacturer and not with the raw
material ... supplier."9 He believes the draft Restatement
would be improved if "existing legal protections for multi-use
raw material and component suppliers" were "expressly re92
tained" in the proposed Restatement (Third).
Another expert on raw material liability law, Charles E.
Erway, III, has supported this view.93 He writes that no liability
should attach to the supplier of non-defective raw materials
with a range of end uses over which the initial supplier has no
control.9 4 In particular, Erway focuses on the temporomandibular joint disorder (TMJ) litigation involving DuPont polymers,
sold under the trade name Teflon. 95 He reports that in ten of
the twelve reported TMJ decisions, DuPont was dismissed from
the suit on the basis, at least in part, that Teflon ® is not hazardous.9 6 In one suit summary judgment was granted in part
and denied in part because the court found no factual issue
existed as to whether DuPont satisfied the "bulk supplier"
defense.9 7 In the last of the twelve reported suits, the Eighth
Circuit affirmed a jury verdict for DuPont.9"
Likewise, in ten cases against raw material suppliers involving toxic, flammable, or otherwise hazardous substances,
Erway's research revealed that six courts dismissed all claims,99
one reversed summary judgment on the basis of a potential
issue of fact, 100 one affirmed a trial court denying manufacturer's

91.
Mansfield, supra note 42, at 222.
92.
Id.
93.
See Erway, supra note 13, at 270.
94.
See id.
95.
See generally id. at 275-79.
96.
See, e.g., Klem v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 19 F.3d 997, 1001 (5th Cir.
1994); Lamontague v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 576, 591-92
(D. Conn. 1993), affd, 41 F.3d 846 (2d Cir. 1994); Nowak v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 1334, 1336-37 (W.D. Mich. 1993); Bond v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 868 P.2d 1114, 1118-19 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993); Longo v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 632 So. 2d 1193, 1196-97 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
97. See Forest v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 791 F. Supp. 1460, 1470-71 (D.
Nev. 1992).
98.
See Rynders v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 21 F.3d 835, 843 (8th Cir.
1994).
99.
See, e.g., Walker v. Stauffer Chem. Corp., 96 Cal. Rptr. 803, 804 (Cal. Ct. App.
1971) (sulfuric acid); Jackson v. Reliable Paste & Chem. Co., 483 N.E.2d 939, 944 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985) (methanol); see also Erway, supra note 13, at 270-71 & n.5.
100. See Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1349 (9th Cir. 1981)
(methyl butyl ketone).
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motion for a new trial as to the liability of raw material supplier, 10 and one reversed a plaintiffs verdict. 10 2 Erway concludes:
The decisions on point generally have indicated that seeking
to impose ... liability [upon ingredient suppliers] is ill
founded, because the duty to properly design, manufacture,
and test a product, and in turn to provide appropriate
warnings, are responsibilities of the product manufacturer.... The manufacturer is almost invariably knowledgeable
regarding its product and is the only one in a position to
°3
provide appropriate product warnings.
Another important cost to society of open-ended liability rules
regarding suppliers of raw materials is huge litigation costs.
Although the raw material supplier wins its cases, the costs of
successfully defending invariably are passed along to the consumer. But the DuPont TMJ implant cases illustrate an even
greater cost to society: The raw material supplier might decide
not to sell its products to manufacturers of medical devices. This
in turn means that people who need the devices will not have
them or that the manufacturers of such devices will have to turn
to raw material suppliers who have no place of business in the
United States. Foreign suppliers can unreasonably raise prices
and also may supply raw materials that are not of merchantable
quality.
A virtual consensus of scholarly and decisional deliberation
concludes that sellers of raw materials are not circumstanced
as to make them properly liable in products liability claims. The
Reporters to the new Restatement agree, stating sellers of raw
materials "are not subject to liability for harm caused by defective design of the end-product. The same considerations apply

101. See Hill v. Wilmington Chem. Corp., 156 N.W.2d 898, 902 (Minn. 1968)
(solvent).
102. See Shell Oil Co. v. Harrison, 425 So. 2d 67, 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (soil
fumigant). In Erway's research, the tenth ruling involved a successful asbestos class
action. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
103. Erway, supra note 13, at 297. Subsequent to the publication of the Erway
article, DuPont has been exonerated in 42 additional suits. See, e.g., Parker v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 909 P.2d 1 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995); Hoyt v. Vitek, Inc., 894
P.2d 1225 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); Westphal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 531 N.W.2d
386 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995); see alsoMemorandum from Ross F. Schmucki, Senior Counsel,
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., TMJ Litigation Status (Aug. 2, 1996) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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to failure-to-warn claims against sellers of raw materials." °4
Mansfield, in turn, identifies a "largely unarticulated rule that
bars many product liability claims against multi-purpose raw
material ... suppliers."'0 5 In sum, Erway also identifies "a
strong case for the nonliability of ingredient suppliers in litigation regarding end products." 6

CONCLUSION

Why is a categorical or de jure immunity for merchantable,
naturally occurring raw materials preferable to a more complicated de facto immunity? Consider this hypothetical: In the
jurisdiction of one state, the rule of evidence states that only
competent witnesses shall testify. No corollary that children
beneath a certain age, such as the age of three years, shall be
presumptively incompetent to testify exists. Over a period of
fifty years, hundreds of children less than three years in age are
proffered as potential witnesses. They are examined preliminarily by the court, and none is permitted to testify. Some are
excluded because they are unable to convince the court that they
know the difference between truth and untruth, and others
because they have insufficient narrative skills, or because they
have insufficient cognitive skills, to be competent witnesses.
Is this country's administration of justice best served by
having a single pole star rule (only competent witnesses shall
testify) followed by individualized de facto determinations of
competence even for classes of potential witnesses who are
invariably found unsuited to testify? Or would the justice system
be better served by making an experience-based de jure rule
that children under the age of three are conclusively presumed
to be incompetent to testify? Raw materials suppliers are not
three-year-olds, but the rationale for limiting their duty is as
strong as it is for precluding young children from wasting the
time of our legal system by placing them on the witness stand.
This Article has attempted to show that in the setting of
design obligations or warning duties for naturally occurring raw
materials, the Reporters' comments should state that the

104.
105.
106.

Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 2, § 10 cmt. c.
Mansfield, supra note 42, at 222.
Erway, supra note 13, at 297.
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ordinary rules of products liability are presumptively inapplicable. Accordingly, the new draft Restatement should be clear in
this regard and provide language to this effect:
Products liability design and warning duties should not
ordinarily apply to bulk sales of merchantable, naturally
occurring raw materials, or the ordinary alloys of such
raw materials, absent a showing of a defect in the
product itself that poses an unreasonable risk of personal physical injury. The rationale for precluding application of products liability to such materials is that in
their unchanged form, naturally occurring raw materials
are not "products" as to which the prevailing design and
warnings obligations may be efficiently or practically
applied.
A rule characterizing producers of non-defective naturally
occurring raw materials as excluded from potential products
liability would focus like a laser beam on design and warning
responsibilities upon the parties truly able to discharge those
duties-the manufacturers of the end-use products. The rule
would also be in harmony with three principal goals of products
liability law: deterrence, risk spreading, and efficiency. The
benefits to society are the elimination of needless litigation costs
and the assurance that non-defective raw materials are available for desirable products.

